Twelve doctors with special training in hepatology independently reviewed two to five cases each from a group of seven cases of complicated hepatobiliary problems. A doctor's willingness to take risks to improve his patients' health was quantified by a wagering technique based on the probability of achieving a successful intervention. These probabilities were then used to calculate "utilities," which represented the average opinion of the doctors about the relative worth of each of six predefined states of health. The results showed that, in the context of risky decisions for severely ill patients, a year of life was considered by the doctors to be worth 44% of a full recovery; being mobile for that year increased this value to 57%. Survival for up to five years with restricted mobility was considered to be worth 70% of a full recovery' and the ability to work during that period increased this value to 85%.
Introduction
One of the most difficult decisions faced by a doctor concerns the choice, in the case of a seriously ill patient, of whether to intervene if failure of the intervention might result in an even worse prognosis. In hepatobiliary disease such a choice may be about giving specific treatment with known side effects or carrying out further, perhaps invasive, diagnostic techniques.
In making the decision the physician has to take account, firstly, of the likelihood of success if he does intervene and, secondly, of the relative merits of the three possible outcomesnamely, success or failure of the intervention or maintenance of the status quo if he decides not to intervene. In such circumstances doctors have always relied on clinical judgment,1-3 and some clinicians seem to have an innate ability to choose the optimum course of action. Others learn by experience, either by emulating their seniors or through facing similar difficult decisions repeatedly during their careers.
A more formal approach is the use of decision analysis.4 6 This entails separating a complex decision problem into its component parts, for each of which a point may be defined at which either one of a choice of actions must be selected or one of a number of events must occur. Any uncertainty about the occurrence of an event is expressed numerically as a probability (p), while the decision maker's preference for each possible consequence (defined in this context as a "state of health") is quantified as a utility (U), with a numerical value being assigned to each of the possible consequences of the decision. Thus the ill defined concept of "risk" is explicitly divided between two components-namely, the likelihood of a poor outcome and the relative value of the consequences of that poor outcome should it occur. By distinguishing between these two aspects of a serious clinical decision it is hoped to increase the likelihood that the decision problem will be carefully evaluated, thereby leading to a considered and consistent judgment based, ideally, on the principle of "maximising expected utility." To make such an analysis based on the assumption that the doctor is the decision maker, the clinicians' utilities for a range of states of health must first be estimated. Therefore, we undertook the present study in hepatobiliary disease to quantify doctors' willingness to take risks to improve the health of patients, and thereby to identify numerical values reflecting the worth of each of several defined states of health as implicitly perceived by a clinician facing a difficult decision.
Methods
We selected seven cases of hepatobiliary disease on the basis that in each case a difficult decision had had to be made on whether to intervene clinically because the intervention might have resulted either in considerable improvement or in deterioration in the patient's state of health. Twelve clinicians, all with specialist training (for two to eight years) in hepatobiliary disease, were presented with a selection of up to five cases for assessment, resulting in a total of 45 decisions. Only cases for which the clinician believed that he could give a confident, unbiased judgment were included for analysis.
EVALUATION OF SUCCESS RATES AND UTILITIES
For each case the doctor was asked to review the patient's history, make a decision on whether to intervene, and state the percentage chance of success (the "success rate") of the intervention that he would require before agreeing to take the associated risk. To obtain this value a "wagering" technique was used: the doctor was asked in sequence whether he would intervene if there was a 950% chance of success; if yes, whether he would intervene if there was a 20% chance; if no, whether he would consider 90% acceptable; and so on until an "indifference point" (expressed as a percentage) was reached, at which the clinician was unable to choose between the potential benefits ofa successful intervention and the risk ofa failed intervention.
The clinician was then shown a decision tree (figure), in which (at the indifference point) the success rate is expressed as a probability (p) and the failure rate, by definition, as l-p, and was asked to assign prognoses to each of the three possible outcomes-that is, Uq, Ut, and U.-of the decision. As this meant defining each of the outcomes in terms of disability and life expectancy the doctor was also asked to state how long he would expect the patient to live and the patient's expected state of health. If he stated that any of the three outcomes could be associated with more than one prognosis the wagering technique was used to determine his opinion of the likelihood of occurrence (as a percentage) of these additional prognoses. These were then incorporated into the same decision tree. Finally, the clinician was asked whether he wished to change his original required success rate.
At the end of this assessment each clinician was asked to comment on whether he had found the sample cases realistic and for his opinion on the merits of setting out such a formal decision tree.
CALCULATION OF UTILITIES
Every prognosis assessed by the doctors was classified by two of us (AT, DS) into one of six states of health (table I) that had been defined before the study; these had not been communicated to the clinicians to avoid influencing their assessments. Of these six states figure) : (p X Us) +(l-p) X Uf =Uq (equation 1) in which, according to decision theory, at the indifference point the product of the probability (p) and the utility (Us) of a successful intervention plus the product of the probability (l-p) and utility (Ut) of a failed intervention is equal to the utility (Uq) of the status quothat is, the expected utility of intervention is equal to the expected utility of the status quo.
The 45 equations so derived (one for each decision) were subjected to least squares analysis (a form of multiple regression)6 to obtain values for U, to U5 that provided the closest possible predictions of the success rate required by the clinicians deviated by more than 10% from the corresponding p, value. The residual standard deviation from the least squares analysis was 13, suggesting that use of the average utilities and equation 2 will predict a doctor's willingness to take risks to that margin of error. 
DOCTORS' OPINIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
The doctors stated that the seven sample cases were realistic and that they had encountered similar problems previously. Predictably, their main difficulties related to attaching numbers to success rates and prognosis. Care must be taken in the way the questions are worded, as responses differ depending on whether questions are asked in terms of "survival rates" or "death rates. "7 In addition, it was fairly time consuming to obtain satisfactory interviews, but, using the wagering technique and decision trees, the clinicians were in general able to give appropriate numbers. All 12 doctors stated that use of the decision trees had encouraged them to assess more deliberately the risks and benefits of an intervention, although two questioned whether patients whose problems were subjected to decision analysis would fare any better than those for whom conventional clinical evaluation was used. After using the decision trees doctors changed their required success rates in four instances and, in two others, changed their original decisions from not intervening to operating on the patient.
Discussion
The present study shows that, even though they are not accustomed to so doing, doctors can explicitly attach numerical values to the chance of occurrence of an event (probability) and that these values can be used to determine implicit utilities for different states of health. Other studies have measured utilities for length of life8 and visual acuity,9 and use of utilities has been recommended in decisions concerning coronary artery bypass surgery,"°genetic counselling," selection of further investigatory tests,'2 and treatment of breast cancer." Clinicians' assessments of the seriousness of errors in the diagnosis of jaundice have also been determined. ' The utility values obtained here could be used as a guide for the individual clinician to the "reasonable" risk to take in a patient with complicated problems of hepatobiliary disease. In practice, the doctor would use the decision tree to assign probabilities and prognoses and then apply to equation 2 the average utility values corresponding to his prognoses, thereby obtaining a ps value reflecting the average opinion of a panel of specialists for the prognoses he had defined. Comparison of this value with his required success rate would either reinforce his decision or warn him to reassess his reason for taking a different view. Indeed, this approach was used to examine individual decisions in the present study, and occasional examples of apparent incoherence (relative to the average opinion) were found. The present values, however, were obtained from a panel of doctors in a single clinical unit, and it remains to be determined whether these values are universally applicable to decisions relating to hepatobiliary disease. Furthermore, these "consensus" utilities took account of only two attributes-namely, life expectancy and disability. Other attributes, such as pain, may need to be assessed, and much of this information will have to be obtained from the patients. It will also be important to determine whether patients' preferences for different states of health mirror those of the clinicians in this study, as the patient's preference for a particular outcome should be regarded as the crucial factor in influencing a decision.'5
Patients' preferences have been measured and their use illustrated in the selection of treatment of lung8 and laryngeal'6 cancer, and surveys of "utilities" of a general population have been carried out.'7 Notwithstanding these unresolved questions, we consider that the utilities obtained in the present study are of more value than an assessment of outcomes based purely on survival.
We believe that the present study shows the feasibility of formally applying decisions analysis to clinical practice. The procedures entailed are a useful adjunct to the normal processes of scrupulous assessment of cases required for clinical decision making, particularly in the context of difficult decisions on the management of severely ill patients. The solution to a patient's problem is usually sought by carefully reading through the case notes and specifically asking him or his family about his chief complaints. Although this takes time, it yields information necessary for solution of the problem. This information must, however, be processed, and decision analysis is a logical approach to handling it.
The present study may be viewed as a first step towards measuring the benefit of treatment, particularly in hepatobiliary disease, so that it may be weighed against risk and cost, thereby leading to decisions that are rational in terms of benefit to the patient and the use of resources.
